Probability Calculator.
By applying probabilistic analysis, we can better understand patterns of submarine cable damage and assess whether the frequency of such events aligns with statistical expectations.
Current probability
Over the past 12 months, 12 cable cuts have been recorded in the Baltic Sea, corresponding to a probability of 0.00011573%.
Probability of submarine cable damage in the Baltic Sea
Why it matters.
Assessing the likelihood that submarine cable damage is purely accidental is crucial for distinguishing between natural incidents and potential acts of sabotage. Undersea communication cables are critical infrastructure, carrying vast amounts of data between nations. Any disruption can have severe geopolitical and economic consequences, making it essential to determine whether such incidents are random maritime accidents or deliberate attacks.
By applying probabilistic analysis, intelligence agencies and security experts can better understand patterns of disruption and assess whether the frequency of such events aligns with statistical expectations. If damage occurs at a rate significantly higher than what would be expected from natural causes, this could indicate hostile intent and warrant further investigation. Conversely, if the probability of accidental damage remains within expected limits, concerns about sabotage may be overstated, preventing unnecessary diplomatic tensions.
"Ruptures of undersea cables that have rattled European security officials in recent months were likely the result of maritime accidents rather than Russian sabotage." – Unnamed official, cited by The Washington Post
However, dismissing the possibility of sabotage without a thorough probabilistic assessment could lead to strategic blind spots. Documenting submarine cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea using OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) data is vital for raising public awareness about the potential threats posed by adversaries engaged in hybrid warfare against Western nations. If certain actors exploit the ambiguity of accidental damage to conduct covert attacks, failing to recognize these patterns could weaken national security and resilience.
Ultimately, a data-driven approach is necessary to differentiate between coincidence and intent, ensuring that policymakers respond appropriately to emerging threats in the increasingly contested maritime domain.